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Thomas Goebel, A Government by the People: Direct Democracy in America, 
1890-1940 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2002). 
For direct democracy, this is the best of times and the worst of times. On one 
hand, U.S. ballots featured many more initiatives and referenda during the 1990s 
than in any other decade; Americans across the country cast advisory or binding 
votes on almost five hundred legislative matters great and small, social and eco- 
nomic, controversial and obscure. Clearly, many advocates believe that their 
elected representatives are corrupt, fatally unresponsive, or both, and that put- 
ting a question straight to the voters is therefore the best way to make good pol- 
icy. But scholars increasingly condemn the initiative and referendum. David 
Broder's Democracy Derailed (2000), John Haskell's Direct Democracy or 
Representative Government? (2001), Larry Sabato, Howard Ernst, and Bruce 
Larson's edited collection Dangerous Democracy? (2001), and Richard J. Ellis' 
Democratic Delusions (2002) all argue, to paraphrase the old lapel button 
attacking the Moral Majority, that direct democracy is neither - not the direct 
connection with voters' preferences it purports to be, and not more democratic, 
either in procedure or substance, than lawmaking by elected representatives. 
Thomas Goebel's A Government by the People: Direct Democracy in 
America, 1890-1940 adds a vital historical dimension to this collective critique. 
Like other students of direct democracy, Goebel concludes that its devices are 
no panacea for the political and economic ills of the U.S. Goebel takes particu- 
lar pains to demonstrate to the left that well-funded corporate interests have 
thoroughly taken over the initiative, referendum, and recall. But where others 
tend to focus on the present and to describe the conservative capture of ballot- 
question politics as a recent development - depicting California's tax-slashing 
Proposition 13 of 1978 as a turning point, for example - Goebel shows that the 
right-wing exploitation of direct democracy began almost a century ago. As one 
frustrated reformer lamented in 191 5, "the referendum is the weapon of conser- 
vatism" (143). 
Goebel's convincing demonstration that "virtually none of the problems 
[with direct democracy] most discussed today are in any way new" (193) may 
be his most impressive contribution to the present-day debate over the strengths 
and weaknesses of ballot measures. But it is by no means all he aims to do in A 
Government by the People, a slim, ambitious, and largely successful book. 
Indeed, his primary goal is to show that the true roots of the American direct 
democracy movement lie in the anti-monopoly and anti-trust politics of the nine- 
teenth century. Second, Goebel interprets direct democracy's early-twentieth- 
century expansion in the United States as "both a social movement and a tacti- 
cal choice" (6), attending to regional and local variations, interest-group politics, 
and essential institutional characteristics of American government. Finally, he 
shows that direct democracy was dogged from the start by the problems that 
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concern critics of the devices today: the dominance of professional signature- 
gatherers, consultants, and advertisers; the power of misleading and flagrantly 
propagandistic language; and the overwhelming need for huge sums of money. 
Ultimately, Goebel's is a cautionary tale - and a severe one, at that - for any 
modern-day progressives who still believe that ballot questions are the best way 
to slice through the stifling grip the two conservative parties hold on American 
electoral and lawmaking processes. 
In the first few chapters of A Government by the People, Goebel makes his 
case for the anti-monopoly roots of the direct democracy movement and 
explains the spread of the devices in American states to 1920. Goebel traces 
anti-monopoly thought in American politics to the Founding era - as he writes, 
Populism was "the culmination of a long reform tradition and of a specific mode 
of economic analysis that reach[ed] back to the beginnings of the American 
republic" (20). That tradition was "populist republicanism," defined here as the 
"belief that state-sponsored privileges and monopolies led to economic inequal- 
ity" (18). Massive inequities in wealth and power, in this view, were not the 
inevitable results of heartless industrial capitalism, but of state action - in par- 
ticular, laws passed by corrupt legislatures. So while farmer cooperatives and 
trade unions focused their energies on the economic sphere, many Populists 
worked for change in the political arena, seeking to limit or do away with the 
special privileges of corporations, monopolistic land grants, and "protective leg- 
islation" of all sorts. 
But reformers were stymied by state legislatures. Charles Francis Adams 
voiced a common view when he wrote that "probably no representative bodies 
were ever more thoroughly venal, more shamelessly corrupt, or more hopeless- 
ly beyond the reach of public opinion" than were many late-nineteenth-century 
state legislatures (26-27). By the 1890s, the increasing use of popular votes to 
ratify new state constitutions and their amendments had acquainted many 
Americans with the notion that some vital political questions must be subject to 
voters' direct approval. So when reformers caught wind of the use of referen- 
dum and initiative in Switzerland - largely through the writings of James W. 
Sullivan, a former printer, union activist, and Henry George supporter - many 
seized on the devices as a way to wrest political power "from a handful of 
pirates, gamblers, and corporation attorneys," as one Populist editor put it (34). 
Goebel next turns to constitutional and theoretical disputes over direct 
democracy's place in American politics. Students of law and political thought 
may find this the most interesting section of the book: Goebel shows that dis- 
putes over the referendum, initiative, and recall brought a sharp, practical scruti- 
ny to the meaning of terms such as democracy, republican government, and "the 
people." Some reformers attacked the Constitution itself as an instrument of 
class rule, but most claimed that direct democracy was filly in the evolving spir- 
it of the document. Opponents raised the specter of "majority tyranny," and 
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argued that direct democracy laws violated the Constitution's guarantee of a 
"Republican Form of Government" in each state, but appellate courts allowed 
the reforms to stand. 
Direct democracy spread unevenly across the United States in the first 
decades of the twentieth century. In the West, Goebel shows that structural fea- 
tures - weak parties, ticket-splitting voters, strong interest groups, and a more 
open political agenda - joined antimonopoly sentiment as factors favoring 
reform. In the South, however, racism largely thwarted reform. White 
Democrats had already instituted numerous devices to keep blacks out of poli- 
tics, and feared that any change would threaten their control. As one North 
Carolina woman worried in a letter to reformer Judson King, "if the Initiative 
and Referendum should be passed, will the colored people and foreigners con- 
trol our country?" (96). Virginian Woodrow Wilson contended that direct 
democracy - "a special question, so far as the South is concerned" - was not 
needed in the region because "actual, genuine representative government" 
already existed there (128). Reformers fared somewhat better in the northeast - 
Maine, Michigan, Ohio, and Massachusetts adopted some form of the initiative, 
referendum, and recall between 1908 and 1918 - but stronger parties and less 
fluid relationships between interest groups limited progress. 
By 1912, the movement had peaked. Two changes explain why reform 
stalled: first, anti-monopoly populist republicanism lost its coherence as an eco- 
nomic theory and political program, and second, the increasingly partisan nature 
of disputes over direct democracy doomed the movement. Both explanations 
are paradoxical, and both are linked to the decline of Populism and the rise of 
Progressivism. As the economy became more nationalized and federal regula- 
tion of interstate commerce expanded, the activities of trusts and big corpora- 
tions became an even more central political topic. At the same time, however, 
corporate power was increasingly understood to have economic rather than 
political causes, and therefore "the goal of regulation slowly replaced political 
reforms as the focus of anticorporate crusaders" (1 16). On the political front, 
meanwhile, support for direct democracy became "a weapon in factional infight- 
ing" (120) among some Progressive leaders. Politicians such as Theodore 
Roosevelt and Wilson - both of whom had earlier opposed direct democracy - 
now offered support, albeit in an uneven and somewhat tepid fashion. But that 
support compromised reformers' ability to build the broad, nonpartisan coali- 
tions that had been crucial to earlier successes. 
Serious differences divided many Progressives and direct-democracy 
reformers. Goebel argues that direct democracy formed an "integral part of the 
Progressive movement" (6), but here he shows that early Progressive authors had 
only contempt for the reforms. Herbert Croly emphasized state-building, effi- 
ciency, and centralized executive responsibility in i%e Promise of American 
Life; Walter Weyl wanted legislators to be trustees, not the mere delegates direct 
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democracy would convert them into - "repeaters of popular deliverances," "par- 
rot-like political phonographs," as Weyl wrote in 1912 (122). Croly later sup- 
ported an Oregon reform that enhanced both executive power and direct legisla- 
tion, but still held that the initiative and referendum were "agencies of minority 
rule" which "fail absolutely" to strengthen enlightened collective action (124). 
Politicians from Robert La Follette to Roosevelt and Wilson only belatedly 
endorsed the measures, and Goebel strongly implies that their stances were more 
tactical than principled. In the end, H.L. Mencken's famous epitaph for Teddy 
Roosevelt's philosophy - "He didn't believe in democracy; he believed simply 
in government" - may best capture the tension between direct-democracy 
reformers and leading Progressives. Goebel could have devoted more space to 
the transition from Populist to Progressive direct democracy; readers who want 
closer scrutiny of that transition should read the fine chapter by Bruce E. Cain 
and Kenneth P. Miller in Sabato, Emst, and Larson's Dangerous Democracy?. 
Cain and Miller argue persuasively that Populists and Progressives had funda- 
mentally different motives in pursuing direct democracy, and contend that the 
Populist conception has prevailed. 
Goebel concludes his narrative with a brief history of direct democracy 
from 1920 to World War 11. This is particularly illuminating and colorful mate- 
rial. Groups which had successfully supported reform failed to make adequate 
use of it from the start - single-taxers, anti-saloon advocates, and labor all met 
defeat or only limited success on the ballots. Meanwhile, former opponents - 
business groups and others who saw the initiative, referendum, and recall as "the 
bastard triplets," in the words of one Santa Barbara attorney -were better organ- 
ized and had more money, and employed the devices more effectively (143). 
Goebel demonstrates that direct democracy was from the beginning dominated 
by "permanent well-organized interests," as one frustrated reformer wrote in 
193 1 ; ballot questions were the very "bulwark of conservatism," another lament- 
ed (153). "All radical measures were defeated," concluded a comprehensive 
1930 study of direct legislation in California, and direct democracy effected "no 
profound alteration in the composition, methods, or objective of the ruling 
elite," as political scientists VO. Key and Winston Crouch wrote in 1939 (148, 
154). 
Goebel goes further, however. In a chapter entitled "Inventing Modem 
Politics," he shows that many of the most important (and most unpleasant) ele- 
ments of twenty-first century politics were anticipated by California's first 
direct-democracy campaigns. Phenomenally expensive elections, the promi- 
nence of political consultants, advertisers, and other professional image-makers, 
and heavy reliance on public-opinion polls - all trace their roots not to the rise 
of television, but to early direct-democracy struggles in the Golden State. 
Through the 1920s, big utilities used huge amounts of money, flagrantly propa- 
gandistic mailings, and fake-grassroots organizations - known today as "astro- 
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turf" groups - to defeat plans for public development and ownership of water 
and power facilities. A Henry George-inspired single-tax plan was crushed by 
a 5-1 margin on the ballot in 1936, after a campaign that the victorious realtors 
said was won by "well directed publicity, cartoons, speeches, radio presenta- 
tions, personal calls, [and] questionnaires" (170). Faced in the same year with 
a proposal to tax chain stores, a business strategist wrote that "a job of mass sell- 
ing is to be done," and he and his allies proceeded to outspend reformers 15 to 
1 to defeat the measure (172). Launching an antiunion initiative in 1938, busi- 
ness groups determined through extensive polling that California voters' "vague 
prejudices must be crystallized into effective and affirmative action on the ini- 
tiative,'' and used what one of their own consultants called "artfully disguised 
and beautifully-sugarcoated propaganda" (176, 175). Their measure failed, 
however, demonstrating that while money is usually enough to defeat an initia- 
tive, cash alone is rarely sufficient to pass one. 
Along with his regionally-organized, institutionally-sensitive analysis of the 
movement's uneven growth, this explanation of direct democracy's role in the 
creation of modem political tactics is one of the most fascinating sections of A 
Government by the People. Goebel has scrutinized dozens of manuscript col- 
lections and newspaper archives as well as hundreds of secondary sources, and 
delivers a comprehensive yet concise picture of the formative early years of 
direct democracy in the U.S. 
Goebel tells the reader at the outset that he will emphasize the economic, 
anti-monopoly dimension of direct democracy's origins (4). If this means he 
wants to prove that antimonopoly sentiment dominated direct democracy's rise, 
he falls short. This is not at all a bad thing, however. For as Goebel's story 
becomes more complex and interesting, the reader becomes less convinced that 
the drive to abolish monopolies motivated most reformers. To be sure, he suc- 
cessfully demonstrates a broad and deep connection between economic discon- 
tent and the rise of the initiative and referendum. This is not an entirely new 
contribution to our understanding of the topic - other authors, including Broder 
and Ellis, come to the same judgment - but Goebel has made the case particu- 
larly well. In describing the diverse, often-delicate coalitions that drove reform, 
he tells a tale of preachers, prohibitionists, and farmers as well as union men and 
single-taxers; shopkeepers, socialists, and wealthy benefactors all hoped to 
effect change through direct democracy. At times leaders had to keep quiet the 
support of drys or suffragettes in order to hold their fragile movements together 
(77, 78), and some important reformers, such as William U'Ren in Oregon and 
minister Herbert Bigelow in Ohio, kept their "economic program in the back- 
ground," lest it frighten away those with different goals (101). Another leader 
argued that direct legislation was "not an integral part of any economic theory 
or scheme" (129). If many citizens and legislators who supported reform were 
ignorant of - even opposed to - antimonopolist goals, there could not have been 
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a straight-line connection between the two. Goebel paints a fine picture of a 
complex and sometimes conflicted movement, but in so doing seems to modify 
his thesis, illustrating that the movement arose from economic protest, but 
developed only because of a much broader set of purposes. 
In terms of political thought, Goebel fails to analyze the rise of direct 
democracy fully in the context of a declining faith in popular sovereignty and 
universal suffrage around the turn of the century, well-documented by authors 
such as Eric Foner, Alexander Keyssar, and Rogers M. Smith. As Foner 
observed in The Story ofAmerican Freedom (1998), "[almong elite thinkers, a 
retreat from the previous consensus in favor of manhood suffrage was among the 
most remarkable developments of the late nineteenth century." (1 19). Indeed, 
the late nineteenth century saw "a recrudescence of antidemocratic theorizing 
on the question of who was entitled to vote," as Morgan Kousser argued in The 
Shaping of Southern Politics (1974) (250-251). That retreat was confined nei- 
ther to racists nor to Southerners. Goebel does not ignore such thought - indeed, 
he scatters pungent illustrations throughout the book (5 1, 57, 60, 92, l l l ,  128- 
129, 149). But while he notes that many direct-democracy advocates shared "an 
abiding skepticism in the competence of voters" (122), Goebel does not inte- 
grate such views into his core analysis of the movement's character and goals. 
Moreover, in a crucial early passage Goebel argues that reformers believed that 
"the people" were a "force of rectitude and honesty" who "would never act 
against their own interests" (26). Later, he writes of Walter Lippmann's disdain 
for the ability of "the people" to direct policy as if such views reflected a novel 
''shift in public and academic opinion" (134), but by 1922 a full generation of 
American elites had been familiar with such views. This retreat does not square 
with the central American political narrative of ceaseless democratization, and 
students of American thought and political development need a better under- 
standing of how it shaped various political reforms of the era. 
A Government by the People will prove useful for students of Populism, 
Progressivism, economic reform, and American political development. Liberal 
advocates and progressive reformers today, meanwhile, should not lose sleep if 
their own direct democracy campaigns - for public campaign financing, say, or 
against big-box development - rely on rich donors or employ the occasional 
misleading euphemism. Such is the beast; no "golden age" of popular reform is 
dishonored by such strategies. On the whole, though, Goebel's sobering mes- 
sage to the American left is that, as a tool to diminish the political influence of 
wealth and corporate power, direct legislation failed a long time ago. 
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